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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
Trade and climate change intersect in many ways. Aside from the broad debate as to whether 
economic growth and trade adversely affect the environment, linkages are recognized 
between existing rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and rules established in 
various multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions promises to be a top priority on both national and international agendas, and 
special attention has been given to the relationship between the WTO and the emerging 
international regime on climate change. 
To date, multilateral efforts to liberalize trade and to prevent global warming have proceeded 
largely on separate paths. Increasingly, however, these parallel regimes, one defined by the 
agreement establishing the WTO and its annexes, the other by the United Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol (not yet in force) are 
likely to come into closer contact as climate change policies lead to significant economic 
effects. Already, a significant potential for conflict exists between the two regimes and the 
interests they represent.
1
 Yet there are also a number of important synergies that can be better 
developed. 
The link between climate change policy and international trade regulation is even closer. 
Climate change policy, pursuing climate change mitigation and adaptation goals, might need 
to use trade restrictive measures, which might even be authorized by a future international 
climate agreement. At the same time, trade-related measures of climate change policy have to 
comply with the rules of WTO law. However, trade rules do not only set constraints on 
climate policy, they also offer opportunities. They can be a tool for climate change policy to 
achieve its objectives.
2
 WTO rules and trade measures (tariffs, taxes, subsidies, etc) can be 
used to facilitate the transfer of green technologies, use of alternative energies sources, and 
reductions in the carbon content of trade. 
                                                          
1
 Brewer, Thomas L. (2003). “The trade regime and the climate regime: Institutional Evolution and Adaptation”. 
Climate Policy, 3: 329-341.  
2
 Bacchus, James (2010), “questions in search of answers: trade, climate change, and the rule of law”. Keynote 
address to the conference on “climate change, trade and competitiveness: issues for the WTO”, Geneva, 16 June 
2010, available at http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/bacchus1 (accessed on 17 May 2011).  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Trade measures have already considerably contributed to climate change mitigation under the 
Montreal Protocol international system of ozone layer.
3
 Some estimates show that the 
Montreal Protocol has reduced GHG emissions four times as much as is intended by the 
Kyoto Protocol.
4
 The success of ozone emissions reductions is largely attributed to the threat 
of trade measures (export and import bans) foreseen by the Montreal Protocol.
5
 
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol do not prescribe the use of trade measures. However, in 
the absence of an agreement on climate change actions at an international level, countries that 
have undertaken emission reduction commitments and introduced emissions trading and tax 
systems are likely to use trade measures to level the playing field for their producers and 
prevent transfer of emissions to countries with lax emissions controls. The most popular idea 
is to restrict the carbon content of imported products in the form of border adjustment 
measures, such as, an emission allowance requirement for an importer, import emission tax, 
an emission-intensity standard applied to imports, etc.  
The unilateral use of carbon-related import restrictions risks triggering retaliation by trading 
partners. It also raises questions about whether such trade measures are consistent with 
countries’ obligations under the WTO. The WTO status of measures imposed not on products 
directly but on the methods by which they were produced, which is the case in carbon-related 
trade restrictions, is not clear. Whether such violations can be excused by exceptions for 
measures taken with the purpose to protect human life or health, or the environment, is an 
open question. There is also the question of whether solutions to the problem of the WTO’s 
inconsistency with regard to trade-related measures in climate change policy can be found. 
This paper explores the relationship between trade and climate change regimes, the potential 
areas of conflict, and what can be done to promote mutual gains. Apart from exploring the 
key issues and examining the conceptual underpinning of the two regimes, revealing 
important symmetries as well as some divergence, the paper is aimed at finding a more 
universal and long lasting solution to the WTO’s inconsistency of carbon-related to GHG 
emissions, both within and outside the WTO. 
                                                          
3
 The Montreal Protocol, which entered into force in 1989, is an international treaty designed to protect the 
ozone layer by phasing out the production and consumption of a number of substances (ODCs) responsible for 
ozone depletion. It is believed to be the most successful international agreement ever concluded.  
4
 Barrett, Scott (2010), “climate change and International Trade: lessons on their linkage from international 
environmental agreements”. Background paper written for the TAIT second conference “Climate change, Trade 
and Competitiveness: htt://graduateinstitute.ch/ctei/home/events/TAIT_climate_conference/TAIT_Papers.html 
(last accessed on 17 May 2011).  
5
 Barrett, Scott (2010), p. 10 ff.  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The multilateral efforts to combat climate change, on the one hand, and expand international 
trade, on the other, are motivated by divergent goals. The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol 
seek largely to stem the potentially negative effects of energy-intensive activity on the 
atmosphere; the WTO and its General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are based on 
the premise that it is the expansion, not contraction, of economic activity through trade that 
will benefit all concerned. The climate change regime endeavours to correct the effect of 
market failure and negative externalities on the environment through economic instruments. 
By contrast, a key motivation of the trade regime is to correct government failure, or the 
inefficiencies arising from protectionist trade policy.
6
 The climate change regime operates on 
the precautionary principle, deploying science to predict future climate fluctuations and 
policies to respond to these effects. With the exception of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement (SPS) for agriculture, science does not play a central role in the trade 
regime.
7
 
However, there are also similarities between the two regimes. Both anticipate long-term 
benefits in the face of short-term compliance costs. Importantly, both regimes are still 
evolving and are attentive to the differentiated interests and obligations of developed and 
developing countries.
8
 Given these similarities and differences, there is much room to discuss 
the potential for discord or synergy between the two regimes. In the recent past, such 
discussion has focused largely on the terms laid out in the Kyoto Protocol, particularly those 
regarding emissions trading and domestic policies that may violate the WTO principles of 
non-discrimination.
9
 In this paper I explore how implementation of certain clean energy 
policies called for in Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol may come into conflict with the WTO, 
while others may in fact be WTO-compatible. I also review the propositions by which 
synergies between the trade and climate change regimes can be increased.  
 
                                                          
6
 Charnovitz S. (2003), Trade and climate: potential for conflicts and synergies, Pew center on global climate, 
Washington DC.  
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Murase S. (2003), WTO/GATT and MEAs: Kyoto Protocol and beyond: GETS/FTC/GISPRI Project 
9
 See for instance Brack, Duckan, Michael Grubb, Craig Windram, (2000). International trade and climate 
change policies.  
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3.  RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
10
 marked a 
progression towards the integration of the economic and environmental aspects of 
international law. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
11
 
reflects this interdependence which was central to the preparations for the UNCED: “In order 
to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection [must] constitute an integral 
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. Agenda 2112 
recognized that the international economy should provide a “supportive international climate 
for achieving environmental and developmental goals”13. 
The international legal issues relating to trade and climate change, and competition and the 
environment, have become controversial in recent years.
14
 The two principal concerns are the 
use of international trade measures in environmental treaties, and the circumstances in which 
one or more states may lawfully adopt “unilateral” or bilateral environmental protection 
measures with respect to obligations flowing from global and regional free trade agreements. 
Due to the interrelationship between trade and climate change, a strong commitment to 
enhancing climate change measures through corporation from bilateral and regional 
perspectives, is a necessary obligation for developing economies, which could suffer from 
environmental depletion caused by regional partners, resulting in economic disputes or 
competition in environmentally sensitive products. 
Proponents of increased dialogue between the trade and climate regimes have been 
confronted with the argument that the two regimes are too single-minded to have anything to 
deliberate about. It is hoped that this paper will demonstrate some fertile ground for 
collaborative efforts. Although such collaboration will hardly be a solution to all of the 
deficiencies of the WTO or the Kyoto Protocol, much good can arise from seeking to avoid 
and prevent trade-climate conflict, and building more environmental sensitivity into the 
multilateral trading system.  
                                                          
10
http://www.eoearth.org/article/United_Nations_Conference_on_Environment_and_Development_%28UNCE
D%29,_Rio_de_Janeiro,_Brazil [Accessed on12 March 2011] 
11
 The Rio Declaration of 1992 had on its objective the establishing a new global and equitable partnership 
through the creation of new levels of co-operation among States, key sectors of society and peoples. 
12
 Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Statement of principles for the 
Sustainable Management of Forests were adopted by more than 178 Governments at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992. 
13
 Agenda 21, paragraph 2.3. 
14
 http://ictsd.org/i/news/bioresreview/12099/ [accessed on 21 March 2011] 
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4.  THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
On the one hand, lowering trade barriers and opening markets boost economic growth, which 
tends to increase GHG emissions. On the other hand, bigger markets spur technological 
innovation and diffusion, which can reduce the GHG intensity of economic growth. 
Moreover, as trade promotes higher national incomes, some countries will find themselves 
better able to afford emission abatement efforts. 
Just as trade policy will have climate effects, climate change policy will have significant 
implications for trade relations and for the trade regime.
15
 By raising the cost of energy and 
energy-intensive goods, climate policies will affect economic competitiveness, both among 
countries undertaking climate efforts, due to different mitigation costs, as well as between 
those countries that undertake significant action and whose governments may seek to 
compensate for the costs of products. Either approach is likely to invite challenge, and 
national policies to reduce GHG emissions may also come into conflict with trade rules to the 
extent that they affect domestic and imported products differently. In an acknowledgement of 
these possibilities, Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the parties shall strive to 
implement policies and measures in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including 
effects on international trade.
16
 Moreover, the Protocol authorizes the parties to take further 
action to promote implementation of this provision.
17
 
The good news is that opportunities exist for making the trade and climate regimes more 
complementary and, potentially, synergistic. The two regimes could, at a minimum, work 
independently and together to anticipate and avoid conflict between their mandates. The 
climate regime, for instance, could facilitate a uniform approach to energy/GHG taxation, 
and, particularly, the application of taxes to imports and exports. Opportunities may also exist 
to promote climate objectives actively through the WTO, for instance, by launching 
negotiations to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. Yet at this time, there may be some trepidation 
within both trade and climate circles about engaging directly with each another.  
 
                                                          
15
 Gibbs, Murray (2003). Energy services, Energy Policies and the Doha Agenda, in United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, Energy and Environmental Services: Negotiating objectives and development 
priorities, UN Conference on Trade and Employment, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2003/3: 3. pp. 16-17 
16
Cameron, James and Zen Makuch (1994). Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: international trade law implications: 116. In : trade and environment: the search for balance, 
James Cameron, Paul Demaret and Damien Geradin (Eds.), May  
17
 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.14  
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5.  RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS  
The current international climate change regime does not explicitly provide for the use of 
trade-related measures. Nevertheless, article 3.5 of the UNFCCC, using the language of 
Article XX of the GATT, urges that “measures taken to combat climate change, including 
unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade”. The inclusion of this language in the UNFCCC 
suggests that the use of trade measures for climate change policy objectives is not excluded. 
It is possible that a post-Kyoto international climate change agreement will contain trade-
related provisions. What would be the relationship between a trade obligation under the WTO 
and a trade obligation under an international climate change regime in this case? 
Therefore, if trade measures are not authorized by a post-Kyoto climate change agreement, 
the safest way is to avoid using them. If used, unauthorised trade measures should either be 
consistent with WTO rules, or they should be designed in a manner which allows their 
justification under the general exceptions of GATT Article XX.
18
 
If trade measures, which conflict with the WTO, are authorized by a new climate change 
agreement, then, to avoid collision with the multilateral trading regime, WTO members will 
have to waive trade measures adopted under a climate change agreement from WTO 
obligations. 
Despite the fact that clarification of the relationship between the WTO and MEAs has been 
assigned by the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
19
 the problem still remains unsettled, as the 
Doha Round is not concluded.
20
 Consequently, at present, the relationship between the trade 
and climate change regimes is characterised by mutual avoidance. Climate change negotiators 
usually prefer to abstain from discussing of climate issues, finding the UNFCCC forum a 
more appropriate place for such discussions.
21
 
                                                          
18
 Tarasofsky, Richard G. (2008),  Heating up international trade law: challenges and opportunities posed by 
efforts to combat climate change, carbon and climate law Review, 1, pp. 7-17  
19
 The Doha Ministerial Declaration is one of two Declarations adopted at the WTO Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, on November 2001, which folded the ongoing negotiations on trade liberalization in 
agriculture and services into the Doha Development Round.  
20
 Two other environment related tasks, listed in the Doha Development Agenda, are the working-out of 
procedures for regular information exchange between MEA secretariats and relevant WTO committees, and the 
reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services. See para. 31 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration  
21
 Weischer, Lutz, Simmons, Benjamin, Van Asselt, Harro, and Zelli, Fariborz (2009),  Introduction-Climate 
and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World in climate and trade policies in a post-2012 world, UNEP, 2009   
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The mutual avoidance between the international trade and climate change regimes on the 
issue of trade-related measures does not guarantee the avoidance of the conflict in the future, 
which can substantially undermine the effectiveness of both regimes. Therefore, countries 
should clarify the relationship between trade-related provisions of an international climate 
change agreement and provisions of the WTO,
22
 and negotiate an effective solution to the 
problem of inconsistency of climate policy-related trade measures with WTO law.  
This paper aims to identify potential legal conflicts between WTO rules and national laws 
and policies to meet targets. Although no trade disputes have yet occurred, the onset of such 
conflicts is only a matter of time, especially when WTO rules remain unclear. The most 
contentious issue will probably be the applicability of process-based energy taxes on 
imported products. Whether such law measures will be able to pass WTO muster will depend 
on how carefully they are written to avoid arbitrary discrimination, and whether a future 
climate change agreement incorporates such measures.  
 
6.  SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The relationship between trade and climate change covers a very broad areas and the research 
does not seek to deal extensively with all the issues due to the limited scope of a research 
paper. This paper will thus be limited to the interaction between trade and climate change, the 
potential areas of conflict, and what can be done to promote mutual gains. Further attention 
will be given to domestic climate change law and policy options that are compatible with 
WTO rules, and which are available to states.   
 
7.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Generally, the study seeks to explore the interplay between the trade and climate change 
regimes. The specific objectives are as follows: 
1. Examine the nexus between trade and climate change. 
                                                          
22
 Clarification of the relationship will enhance mutual supportiveness of the trade and climate change policies. 
As it was pointed out by Cottier and Oesch (2005), to achieve the respective regulations should take into 
consideration the objectives, interests and constraints of the others. See Cottier and Oesch (2005), p. 517  
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2. Analyse the potential areas of conflict between a climate change regime and trade 
liberalisation under the WTO. 
3. Explore the possibility of promoting the synergies between the two regimes, and look 
at the ways by which a co-operation between the two regimes could be promoted. 
4. Provide suggestions for addressing the potential conflict to the Committee on Trade 
and Environment (CTE) whose mandate, it is to make recommendations on whether 
to modify WTO provisions in order to ensure that trade relations contribute to the 
objectives of sustainable development.
23
 
 
8.  RESEARCH METHODS 
The methodology for this research paper will consist of library research and document 
analysis, focusing on books, journals, case law, reports from the WTO on trade and 
environment matters, the UNFCCC, and different non-governmental organisations. The 
literature review will also include relevant legislation on trade and the environment, as well 
as official publications from the WTO Ministerial Department on Trade and Environment. 
These sources are relevant as they serve to identify the nature and scope of trade laws in 
relation to climate change at both national and international level, and which determine the 
intention of the legislature in respect of trade and the environment. The sources also offer an 
objective examination of the implementation and enforcement of the conventions or treaties 
on trade and the environment in different jurisdictions, and will therefore help to critically 
assess the policy and legislation that protect trade and the environment. The data for this 
study will therefore be obtained through an analysis of the relevant literature instead of field 
work.  
 
9.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Interaction between trade and climate change should promote greater understanding between 
policy-makers and enable them to examine command and control strategies, energy 
                                                          
23
 Shaw and Schwartz, (2002) “Trade and environment in the WTO State of play” Journal of the World Trade, 
Volume 36. Kluver Law International: 129-154  
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efficiency opportunities, taxes, emissions trading, subsidy reform, and inducements for 
technological progress. 
Trade intersects with climate change in a multitude of ways. This is due in part to the 
innumerable implications that climate change may have both in terms of its potential impacts 
and in terms of the profound regulatory and economic changes which will be required to 
mitigate, and adapt to, these impacts. 
The findings of the study could act as a guide to climate change laws, and to administrators, 
policy- makers and other related stakeholders, by enabling them to know the scope of climate 
change in their respective countries. In addition, the study will add to the knowledge of 
students in related subjects or fields, and may provide a stimulus for research on similar or 
related topics.  
 
10.  OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS  
This research paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the 
entire study. It includes an introduction, background to the paper, the research problem, the 
research question, the hypothesis, the scope of the research, a theoretical assumption, the 
research methodology, the rationale, the significance of the study, and a chapter outline. 
Chapter two analyses the interaction between the trade and climate change regimes. It focuses 
on the relationship between the WTO agreements and the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, the 
fundamental difference between the two regimes, the potential areas of conflict between the 
two regimes, and the possible joint solutions within the WTO and/or UNFCCC. The third 
chapter discusses the relevant provisions of the WTO. 
The fourth chapter discusses domestic law and policies options that may comply with WTO 
law, which are available to states. This chapter considers whether domestic climate change 
law and policy options (inter alia, energy/GHG taxes, product regulations and standards, 
subsidies, and domestic emissions trading) are compatible with WTO rules. 
Chapter five contains recommendations which the writer believes will promote greater 
synergies between the trade and climate change regimes. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn 
from the discussions in the paper.   
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CHAPTER II 
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE REGIMES 
2.1. Introduction 
The interaction between trade and climate change regimes contains tensions and even 
conflicts. A conflict originates from the nature of the objectives of the two regimes.
24
 The 
climate change law and policy focuses on protection (it protects climate system from negative 
anthropogenic impacts); whereas the trade law and policy promotes liberalization (it seeks to 
provide free access of goods and services to a global market). As a consequence of the 
discrepancies in the objectives, proponents of free trade worry that the protection of climate 
system will be used as an excuse for protection of domestic industries; whereas 
environmentalists are afraid that the theory of free trade will be used to maximize profit 
totally neglecting environmental needs.
25
  
Moreover, the difference between the trade and climate change regimes is that climate change 
mitigation is a global public good, whereas trade is a mutual activity.
26
 As a public good, 
climate change mitigation is characterized by a free riding and prisoner’s dilemma 
problems.
27
 Hence, dealing with the problem of climate change requires an intervention of 
the government to correct the market failure to internalize the costs of pollution, whereas 
liberalization of trade implies restraining government interventions to minimize market 
distortions of state regulations.
28
 
However, there are not only discrepancies but also similarities between the trade and climate 
change regimes. Their purpose is the same: both of them seek to promote sustainable 
development and increase the wellbeing of people. Good climate conditions are essential for 
life and health of people, while trade increase their wealth. 
                                                          
24
 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Kim, Jisun  (2009), “The World Trade Organisation and Climate Change: 
challenges and options”, Working Paper Series, Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 
2009, available at htt://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp09.pdf 
25
 Frankel, Jeffrey (2005), “Climate and Trade: links between the Kyoto Protocol and WTO”, Environment, 47 
(7): 8-19, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel/KyotoGEnvirO5j-pub.pdf  
26
 Barrett, Scott (2010), “climate change and international trade: lessons on their linkage from international 
environmental agreements”. Background paper written for the TAIT second conference climate change, trade 
and competitiveness: issues for the WTO, Geneva, 16-18 June 2010, available at 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/ctei/home/events/TAIT_Papers.html  
27
 Barrett, Scott (2010), pp 1-2 
28
 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Kim, Jisun (2009), p. 4 
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From a legal point of view, there is no hierarchy between the trade and climate change 
regimes. Both sets of rules have equal status under international law, notwithstanding they 
were adopted in different fora.
29
 
 
2.2. Relationship between the WTO Agreements and the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol 
The potential of the conflict between the trade and climate change regimes is difficult to 
estimate, to a large extent because of the indefinite relationship between the rights and 
obligations of countries under the WTO agreements and their rights and obligations under the 
UNFCCC or any future international climate agreement. There is a debate about the 
relationship between WTO rules and trade-related provisions of multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs), or “specific trade obligations” (STOs), as they are usually called in 
MEAs.
30
 
Specific trade obligations in MEAs tend to conflict with WTO rules. The most common 
violations of WTO rules by MEAs include:
31
 
- A violation of the most-favored nation (MFN) principle (GATT Article I). for 
instance, the Montreal Protocol allows trade in ozone depleting substances (ODSs) 
with parties to the protocol and prohibits (through import and export bans) with non-
parties; 
- A violation of the national treatment principle (GATT Article III). MEAs often 
differentiate between products based on the way they are produced (e.g. using or not 
using ODSs under the Montreal Protocol). Differential treatment of imported and like 
domestic products based on non-product-related process and production methods 
(PPMs) can hardly pass the likeness and non-discrimination tests under Article III; 
- A violation of prohibition of quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XI). For 
instance, import and export bans under the Montreal Protocol might qualify as 
prohibited import/export quantitative restrictions. 
                                                          
29
 WTO (2004), submission by the EC to the CTE, “the relationship between WTO Rules and MEAs in the 
context of the Global Governance System”, 24 March 2004, TN/TE/W/39.  
30
 WTO (1996), Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment to the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Singapore, 8 November 1996, PRESS/TE 014.  
31
 Deal, Timothy E. (2008), “WTO Rules and Procedures and their Implication for the Kyoto Protocol”. 
Discussion Paper, USCIB, January 2008, available at http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_Kyoto_2008.pdf   
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The question is how a conflict between obligations of parties under MEAs and their 
obligations under the WTO Agreement should be settled.  
The current international climate change regime does not explicitly provide for the use of 
trade-related law measures. Nevertheless, article 3.5 of the UNFCCC, using the language of 
article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), urges that “measures 
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”. The 
inclusion of this language in the UNFCCC suggests that the use of trade law measures for 
climate change law and policy objectives is not excluded. It is possible that a post-Kyoto 
international climate agreement will contain trade-related provisions. What would be the 
relationship between trade obligations under the WTO and trade obligations under an 
international climate agreement in this case?  
Even if no trade-related provisions are included in a post-Kyoto agreement, the question is 
whether trade law and measures that are not specifically authorized by MEAs can still be 
used by parties to MEAs to achieve its objectives. Switzerland proposed an interpretation of 
specific trade obligations, which could open the door to the use of trade-related law and 
measures in support of implementation of MEAs, even if such law and measures are not 
explicitly authorized by MEAs.
32
 
Therefore, if trade law and measures are not authorized by a post-Kyoto climate change 
agreement, the safest way is to avoid using them. If used, unauthorized trade law and 
measures should either be consistent with WTO rules, or they should be designed in a manner 
which allows their justification under general exceptions of GATT article XX.
33
 
If trade law and measures, which conflict with WTO law are authorized by a new climate 
change agreement, to avoid collision with the multilateral trading regime WTO members will 
have to waive trade law and measures taken under a climate agreement from WTO 
obligations. The problem would still remain with the WTO members that are not parties to a 
                                                          
32
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33
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climate agreement.
34
 What to do if a WTO member is not party to the international climate 
agreement? 
Article 31:3 (c) of the Vienna Convention of the law of Treaties (VCLT) says that along with 
the context of the relevant provisions of a treaty, “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” should be taken into account. As interpreted 
by the panel in the EC-Biotech case, “the parties” in article 31:3 (c) of the VCLT are all the 
parties to a treaty being interpreted (in casu the WTO agreement).
35
 Therefore, the 
applicability of provisions of an international climate agreement to a WTO agreement dispute 
might require not only that all the parties to the dispute are at the same time the parties to a 
climate agreement, but also that all WTO members are at the same time the parties to a 
climate agreement. The panel left this question open.
36
 Such inference is also supported by 
article 34 of the VCLT, which stipulates that it is not possible to require from a third state an 
observation of rules of a treaty without its consent. Hence, violations of WTO obligations by 
trade law and measures taken under a climate agreement can easily be challenged by WTO 
members not party to that climate agreement. 
Despite the fact that clarification of the relationship between the WTO and MEAs has been 
assigned by the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
37
 the problem still remains unsettled, as the 
Doha Round is not concluded.
38
 Consequently, at present, the relationship between the trade 
and climate change law and policy measures and laws to the WTO, trade negotiators usually 
prefer to abstain from discussions of climate issues, finding the UNFCCC forum a more 
appropriate place for such discussions.
39
 
The mutual avoidance between the international trade and climate change regimes on the 
issue of trade-related law and measures does not guarantee the avoidance of the conflict in 
                                                          
34
 Deal (2008), p. 12. The current Doha Round negotiations with a view to enhancing the mutual 
supportiveness of trade and environment are limited in scope to the applicability of “such existing WTO rules 
as among parties to the MEA in question” (Doha Declaration, para 31).  
35
 EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, panel report, para. 7.68.  
36
 EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, panel report, para. 7.72.  
37
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38
 Two other environment-related tasks, listed in the Doha Development Agenda, are the working-out of 
procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and relevant WTO committees, and 
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39
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the future, which can substantially undermine the effectiveness of both regimes. Therefore, 
countries should clarify the relationship between trade-related provisions of an international 
climate agreement and provisions of the WTO,
40
 and negotiate an effective solution to the 
problem of inconsistency of climate policy-related trade law and measures with WTO law.  
 
2.3. Fundamental difference between the two regimes 
Although the trade and climate change regimes have different aims and purposes, they do in 
fact enjoy many common features. Both regimes aim to promote greater economic efficiency 
in order to enhance public welfare. Both regimes recognize linkages between the economy 
and the environment.
41
 Both look to the future and advocate actions that, while bringing on 
short-term adjustment costs, anticipate long-run benefits. Both regimes are worried about free 
riders and devote considerable attention to securing compliance. Both regimes are deferential 
to the violations of developing countries, and follow principles of “special and differential 
treatment” or “common but differentiated responsibilities”. Lastly, both regimes are dynamic 
works-in-progress, continuing institutional improvements during successive negotiations
42
  
Despite certain common features and shared views on the importance of sustainable 
development, a fundamental difference exists between the UNFCCC and the WTO regimes. 
Charnovitz (2003)
43
 has pointed out that climate change presents an extreme case of market 
failure to incorporate the damage done by GHG emissions into the prices of goods and 
services, and that a classic role for governments is to correct market failures. However, 
governments normally want great flexibility in the choice of national instruments to correct 
                                                          
40
 Cottier, Thomas and Matthias Oesch (2005), International Trade Regulation: law and policy in the WTO, the 
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41
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market failure, because they need to balance the economic characteristics of alternative 
measures against their political acceptability. By contrast, the trade rules embodied in the 
GATT and the WTO presuppose a world of market economic and attempt to discipline 
government failures that lead to economic distortions with the flavor of mercantilism and 
protectionist. The climate change regime operates on the precautionary principle, deploying 
science to predict future climate fluctuations and policies to respond to these effects.  Another 
difference between the two regimes is cultural. In the climate change regime, science plays a 
central role in measuring the problem, and in evaluating law and policy responses. In the 
trading system, science plays no role in rulemaking.
44
 
Because of their distinctive motivations, successful outcomes in the two regimes are defined 
differently. Although the trading prefers to move ahead with joint cooperation, the reality is 
that trade liberalization is often in each country’s own interest, and so countries can move at 
different speeds. By contrast in the climate change regime, a high degree of inter-
governmental cooperation is necessary if GHG emissions reduction is to be obtained. As a 
result, non-participation in the climate change regime is ultimately a more serious matter than 
in the trade regime. Even if countries did not trade with each other, the climate change regime 
would need cooperation in order to succeed. The fact that countries do trade brings the WTO 
into the picture.  
 
2.4 Possible joint solutions within the WTO and UNFCCC 
Although justification of a border adjustment measure under article XX is not entirely 
excluded, it will be difficult to design and implement a carbon related border adjustment 
measure in a way consistent with the purpose, scope and requirements of article XX, 
especially of the chapeau. Furthermore, justification of law and measure under article XX can 
be made each time only through litigation between the parties to a dispute in the WTO. This 
implies that the problem of violation of WTO rules will have to be resolved each time anew. 
Therefore, there seems to be a need for long-lasting institutional solutions to the problem of 
WTO inconsistency of carbon-related border adjustment measures. 
                                                          
44
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Proposals have been made to initiate negotiations among the WTO members to reach a 
multilateral understanding or even an agreement on border adjustment measures on carbon 
and energy taxes and permissibility of application of processes and production methods 
(PPMs)-related measures for environmental and other legitimate purposes.
45
 An alternative 
approach would be to adopt a protocol or resolution on trade-related climate change law and 
policy measures among the parties to the UNFCCC.
46
 There is also the third way: to establish 
a joint WTO-UNFCCC Working Group on climate-related border adjustment measures.
47
 
Whatever track is chosen, it seems unfeasible today to create one global super-regulatory 
forum for gradual coordination and harmonization of trade-related instruments of climate 
change law and policy.
48
 
 
2.4.1 Solutions within the WTO 
The uncertainty about the status and legality of climate change law and policy trade-related 
measures under WTO law can be explained to a great extent by the lack of adjudication on 
these matters. 
So far, there have been no disputes between WTO members resulting from conflict between 
the WTO and the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol provisions. A dispute between the WTO 
members on trade-related climate change law and policy measures, including carbon-related 
border adjustments, could help decide on their permissibility. The panel and Appellate Body 
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rulings from a series of WTO disputes could later from a set of rules on the use of trade 
instruments for climate change law and policy purposes.
49
  
The possible outcome of such litigation would be difficult to predict. On the one hand, it is 
unlikely that the WTO adjudicative bodies would authorize trade-restrictive law and 
measures which are not even authorized by the relevant MEAs, i.e. the UNFCCC/Kyoto 
Protocol. It should be remembered that, in most of the environmental disputes in the WTO
50
, 
environmental law and measures have been found incompatible with WTO law. This might 
suggest that if a conflict arose over trade-related law and measures of MEAs, it would be 
ruled in favor of WTO law.
51
 On the other hand, the public awareness of the importance of 
climate change mitigation is so strong that it might influence a WTO panel’s decision to 
accept such law and measures. Moreover, as noticed by McRae
52, the Appellate Body’s 
decision in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II to interpret likeness on a case-by-case basis.
53
 
The advantage of the solution through WTO adjudication is that parties to a dispute would 
not lose anything from the outcome of the litigation, not even a defendant (i.e. a country 
which imposed a measure such as energy/GHG taxes, product regulations and standards, 
subsidies, and domestic emissions). Even if a measure were to be found to violate WTO law, 
there would be no sanctions imposed on a country for its past action and the country could 
thus change its legislation upon an eventual decision of a panel or the Appellate Body or offer 
a compensation for its refusal to comply with the decision under article 22 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.
54
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2.4.2 Solutions within the UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC can also be chosen as forum for discussing trade-related climate change law 
and policy measures. 
It has been the opinion of the WTO Committee on Trade and environment since 1996 that all 
disputes over trade-related law and measures taken under MEAs should possibly be resolved 
in the framework of the MEA.
55
 More recently, in the context of climate change, Pascal 
Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, has expressed the view that the WTO is already 
overloaded with the tasks under the Doha Development Agenda and to take now on extra 
negotiations on permissibility of trade-related climate change law and policy measures would 
lead to frustration. Therefore, these issues should be addressed by a post-Kyoto agreement 
between the UNFCCC members.
56
 
Hoerner and Muller
57
 also find the UNFCCC a more appropriate forum to resolve conflict 
which may occur between trade and climate change law and policies than the WTO. They 
point to the little space given in the WTO agreements for environmental concerns. They 
propose to adopt a resolution by the UNFCCC parties that would override any conflicting 
provisions of the GATT and other WTO agreements concerning the application of climate 
change law and policy trade-related measures, in particular. 
A resolution or a protocol on climate change law and policy border adjustment measures if 
adopted within the UNFCCC cannot be legally binding for the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, if a dispute is brought to the WTO. Nevertheless, Hoerner and Muller believe that a 
protocol on trade-related climate change law and policy measures if adopted by the UNFCCC 
parties could be legally biding for those WTO members that are also parties to the 
UNFCCC.
58
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The ideal solution would be to have provisions on the use of border adjustment measures 
(BAMs) and other trade-related law and measures in a comprehensive international post-
Kyoto climate agreement with its own dispute settlement system deciding on compliance 
with these rules and in parallel an agreement between WTO members on the relationship 
between the climate change and the WTO agreements.
59
 In this case, all conflicts between the 
two bodies of international law would be precluded. However, given different interests of 
negotiating partners both in the UNFCCC and in the WTO this solution is hardly feasible. 
The issue of carbon-related border adjustments is one of the most divisive in the UNFCCC 
negotiations on a future regime. Developing countries are vehement opponents of such 
measures as they fear that this would be just another excuse for protectionism and would 
hinder considerably their exports of carbon-intensive products. The culmination of 
discussions over the possibility to impose such law and measures on the part of developed 
countries was reached by the end of the preparations to the COP 15 in Copenhagen in late 
2009 after which this issue was dropped from the final agenda of the conference as one which 
could devastate the negotiating process. The final document of the conference, the 
Copenhagen accord, contains references neither to border adjustments nor to any other trade-
related measures which might be used in support of climate change law and policy. It is not 
certain whether the issue of border adjustments will be actively discussed in the next climate 
conference in Durban, South Africa at the end of 2011.   
Barret (2010)
60
, referring to the experience of the ozone layer protection system, emphasizes 
the importance of having an agreement on trade restrictions, if countries intend to use them 
for climate change law and policy objectives. Despite WTO inconsistency of trade law and 
measures foreseen by the Montreal Protocol (GATT article I and XI violations etc.), no 
country has challenged them in the WTO, as these law and measures were approved by all 
the parties voting on the protocol. The inclusion of trade law and measures in the protocol has 
resolved issues of their fairness and legitimacy.
61
 
UNFCCC parties may also reach an agreement on the no use or restricted use of trade-related 
carbon measures, including border adjustment measures. Such an agreement may also be 
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either as a provision included in a post-Kyoto climate agreement or as a separately signed 
agreement. India has already made an attempt to include such a provision. The paragraph 
which India proposed to include in the negotiating text of a post-Kyoto agreement for the 
Copenhagen conference in 2009 reads: “Developed country Parties shall not resort to any 
form of unilateral measures including countervailing border measures, against goods and 
services imported from developing countries on grounds of protection and stabilization of 
climate. Such unilateral measures would violate the principles and provisions of the 
Convention, including, in particular, those related to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (article 3, Paragraph 1); trade and climate change (article 3 
paragraph 5); and the relationship between mitigation actions of developing countries and 
provision of financial resources and technology by developed country Parties (article 4, 
Paragraph 3 and 7).
62
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
At the outset, it would appear that multilateral efforts to combat climate change on the one 
hand and expand international trade on the other are motivated by divergent goals. The 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol seek largely to stem the potentially negative effects of 
energy-intensive activity on the atmosphere; the WTO/GATT are based on the premise that it 
is the expansion, not contraction, of economic activity through trade that will benefit all 
concerned. The climate change regime endaviours to correct market failure and negative 
externalities on the environment through economic instruments. By contrast, a key 
motivation of the trade regime is to correct government failure, or the inefficiencies arising 
from protectionist trade law and policy.
63
 The climate change regime operates on the 
precautionary principle, deploying science to predict future climate fluctuations and law or 
policies to respond to these effects. With the exception of the SPS Measures Agreement for 
agriculture, science does not play a central role in the trade regime.
64
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However, there are also similarities between the two regimes. Both anticipate long-run 
benefits in the face of short-term compliance costs. Importantly, both regimes are still 
evolving and are attentive of the differentiated interests and obligations of developed and 
developing countries.
65
 Given these similarities and differences, there is much room to 
discuss the potential for discord or synergy between the two regimes. In recent past, such 
discussion has focused largely on the terms laid out in the Kyoto Protocol, particularly 
regarding emissions trading and domestic law and policies that may violate WTO principles 
of non-discrimination.  
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CHAPTER III 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS UNDER WTO LAW 
1. Introduction 
Several WTO disciplines may come into play if a carbon/energy tax or an emission trading 
scheme and /or their adjustments affect international trade.
66
 The literature has been very 
prolific on the extent to which GATT and WTO rules would apply to border law measures 
based on the carbon content of products or based on the adoption of “comparable” climate 
change mitigation law and measures.
67
 
A number of factors has been triggered the discussion in the WTO, inter alia: (1) the recent 
design by governments of new law and policy mechanisms to mitigate climate change; (2) the 
concerns over competitiveness and carbon leakage and the related risk of protectionism; (3) 
the absence of universal commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the related 
temptation to use trade law measures to encourage reduction in emissions; and (4) some 
perceived legal uncertainties in GATT and WTO provisions about measures on production 
process, as they have not yet been clarified in the dispute settlement system of the WTO. 
This chapter focuses on one of the key disciplines of the GATT and WTO agreements: the 
non-discrimination principle (i.e. national treatment principle and the most-favored nation 
clause). Moreover, if a trade-related climate change law measures is found to be consistent 
with one of the core provisions of the GATT (e.g. articles I, III or XI), justification could still 
be sought under article XX. This is the focus of the last point in this chapter. 
Other measures and WTO agreements may be also relevant to climate change related law 
measures such as the prohibition of quantitative restrictions
68
 and measures on technical 
barriers to trade. Also, the provisions of the agreement on subsidies and countervailing 
measures (ASCM) may be relevant to emission trading schemes, for instance if allowances 
are allocated free of change. Some authors
69
 are of the view that free allowances could 
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constitute actionable subsidies covered by the SCM agreement.
70
 It should be noted however 
that if free allowances are found to be actionable subsidies covered by the SCM agreement, 
“adverse effects” would have to be demonstrated for action to be taken by another WTO 
member.  
 
2.  Non-discrimination principle 
2.1. National treatment  
The national treatment principle may be particularly relevant in case where a climate changes 
related regulation is applied differently to domestic and foreign producers. The national 
treatment principle is a key discipline of the WTO and GATT. In accordance with GATT 
article III, a member shall not discriminate between its own and like foreign products (giving 
them “national treatment”). 
Article III.2 deals specifically with internal taxes or other internal charges. For a tax or 
charge on imports to fall under this provision, it needs to apply “directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products”. The key question is whether a potential tax on CO2 emissions released 
during the production process will be considered to be a tax applied indirectly to products. 
For taxes or charges on imports to be consistent with article III.2, they should not be applied 
“in excess” to taxes levied on like domestic products. Moreover, in accordance with GATT 
article III.2, second sentence, and the Ad Note, “directly competitive or substitutable” 
imported and domestic products shall incur similar taxes, and these shall not be applied so as 
to afford protection to domestic production.  
GATT article III.4 addresses “laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use” of products. As indicated by 
the Appellate Body in the US-FSC (article 21.5, EC) case, the word “affecting” in article III.4 
can be interpreted as having a “broad scope of application”.71 Article III.4 provides that, in 
respect of all such regulations and requirements, imported products shall not be accorded 
treatment less favorable than that accorded to like domestic products. In the Korea-various 
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measures on the Beef case, the Appellate Body found that imported products are treated less 
favorably than like products if a measure modifies the conditions of competition in the 
relevant market to the detriment of imported products.
72
 
The national treatment principle is also found in several other WTO agreements, such as the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement (articles 2, 5, Annex 3.D) and the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (article 2). On the other hand, it should be noted that in 
the GATS, article XVII allows a WTO member to maintain discriminatory conditions on its 
national treatment obligations unless it commits otherwise.  
 
2.2.   Most-favored nation clause 
According to the most-favored nation clause, a WTO member shall not discriminate between 
“like” products from different trading partners (giving them equally “most favored-nation” 
status). GATT article 1.1 provides that “any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity” granted 
by any member to any product originating in or destined for any other member shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all others members. As explicitly provided in article 1.1, the scope of 
application of this provision also extends to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
article III. The most-favored nation clause is also found in other WTO agreements, including 
article II of the GATS and article 2 of the TBT agreement.  
 
2.2.1. Definition of like products 
One of the key questions discussed in relation to the application of the non-discrimination 
principle as contained in GATT article I and III related to the “likeness” of domestic and 
imported products. This is an important question: when a domestic product and imported 
product are found to be “like”, their treatment must be consistent with the national treatment 
principle and the most-favored nation clause. 
The question of the definition of “likeness” has been addressed by a number of dispute 
settlement cases. As rephrased
73
 by the appellate Body in the EC-Asbestos case, the analysis 
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of the likeness of products is based on four categories of “characteristics” that the products 
involved might share:
74
 “(1) the physical properties of the products; (2) the extent to which 
the products are capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; (3) the extent to which 
consumers perceive and treat the products as alternative means of performing particular 
functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (4) the international 
classification of the products for tariff purposes”.75 
The Appellate Body has made it clear that the concept of likeness is one that needs to be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis:
76
 the four criteria are simply tools to assist in the task of 
sorting and examining the relevant evidence and not a closed list of criteria that determine the 
legal characterisation of products.
77
 
An important question in relation to the application of the four above-mentioned criteria to 
climate change law measures is whether products may be considered “unlike” because of 
differences in the way in which they have been produced, even though the production method 
used does not leave a trace in the final product, i.e. even if the physical characteristics of the 
final product remain identical.  
 
3. GATT article XX exceptions 
A number of authors have underlined the importance of the case law related to GATT article 
XX on general exceptions in the context of climate change related law measures.
78
 If a 
particular law measures is inconsistent with one of the core provisions of the GATT (e.g. 
articles I, III or XI), it could still be justified under article XX. Article XX lays out a number 
of specific instances in which WTO members may be exempted from GATT rules. Two 
exceptions are of particular relevance to the protection of the environment: paragraphs (b) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
73
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and (g) of article XX. According to these two paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy 
and law measures that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b), or relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)). 
GATT article XX on general exceptions consists of two cumulative requirements. For a 
GATT-inconsistent environmental law measure to be justified under article XX, a member 
must perform a two-tier analysis proving: firstly, that its measure falls under at least one of 
the exceptions (e.g. paragraphs (b) and/or (g), two of the ten exception, under article XX); 
and, secondly, that the measure satisfies the requirements of the introductory paragraph (the 
“chapeau” of article XX), i.e. that it is not applied in a manner which would constitute “a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where or same 
conditions prevail”, and is not “a disguised restriction on international trade.79 
 
3.1. Environmental law and policies covered by Article XX  
WTO member’s autonomy to determine their own environmental objectives has been 
reaffirmed on a number of occasions (e.g. in US-Gasoline, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres). The 
Appellate Body also noted, in the US-shrimp case, that conditioning market access on 
whether exporting members comply with law and policy unilaterally prescribed by the 
importing member was a common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one the 
exceptions of article XX.
80
 In past cases, a number of law and policies have been found to fall 
within the realm paragraphs (b) and (g) of article XX: (1) law and policies aimed at reducing 
the consumption of cigarettes,
81
 protecting dolphins,
82
 reducing risks to human health posed 
by asbestos,
83
 reducing risks to human, animal and plant life and health arising from the 
accumulation of waste tyres
84
 (under article XX (b)); and (2) law and policies aimed at the 
conservation of tuna,
85
 salmon and herring,
86
 dolphins,
87
 turtles,
88
 petroleum,
89
 and clean air
90
 
(under article XX (g)).  
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Although law and policies aimed at climate change mitigation have not been discussed in the 
dispute settlement system of the WTO, the example of the US-Gasoline case may be relevant. 
In this case, the panel had agreed that the law and policy reduce air pollution resulting from 
the consumption of gasoline was the law and policy concerning the protection of human, 
animal and plant life or health as mentioned in article XX (b).
91
 Moreover, the panel found 
that the law and policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was the law and policy to conserve 
a natural resource within the meaning of article XX (g).
92
 Against this background, some 
authors have argued that the law and policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions could fall 
under article XX (b), as they intend to protect human being from the negative consequences 
of climate change (such as flooding or sea-level rise), or under article XX (g), as they intend 
to conserve not only the planet’s climate but also certain plant and animal species that may 
disappear because of global warming.
93
 
Also in the US-Shrimp case, the Appellate body accepted as law and policy covered by article 
XX (g) on that applied not only to turtles within the United States’ waters but also to those 
living beyond its national boundaries. The Appellate Body found that there was a sufficient 
nexus, or connection, between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved 
and the United States for purposes of article XX (g).
94
 This point is particularly important in 
the context of climate change mitigation law and policies. Some authors have indeed argued 
that this finding could be relevant to establishing a sufficient nexus between a member’s 
domestic mitigation law and policy or a border measure and the intended objective of this law 
and policy, the protection of a global common asset, the atmosphere.
95
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
86
 GATT Panel, Canada-Herring and Salmon  
87
 US-Tuna (Mexico) and US-Tuna (EEC).  
88
 Appellate body, US-Shrimp and appellate body, US-Shrimp (article 21.5-Malaysia) 
89
 Unadopted GATT Panel, US-Taxes on automobiles.  
90
 Appellate body, US-Gasoline.  
91
 Panel, US-Gasoline, para. 6.21  
92
 Panel, US-Gasoline, para. 6.37  
93
 Meyer-Ohlendorf, N. and Gerstetter, C. (2009), “trade and climate change, triggers or barriers for climate 
friendly technology transfer and development?” Dialogue on globalization, occasional Paper 41, p. 36  
94
 Appellate Body, US-Shrimp, para. 133  
95
 Pauwelyn, J. (2007), US Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness concerns: the limits and options of 
international trade law, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy solutions, Duke University, Working Paper, 
p. 35.  
 
 
 
 
28 
 
3.2. Degree of connection between the means and the environmental law and policy 
objectives  
In order for a trade-related climate change law measure to be eligible for an exception under 
article XX, paragraphs (b) and (g), and a connection needs to be established between its 
stated climate change law and policy goal and the measure at issue. The measure needs to be 
either: necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b) or 
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)). 
To determine whether a measure is “necessary” to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health under article XX (b), a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors has been 
used by the Appellate Body, including the contribution made by the environmental law 
measure to the policy objective, the importance of the common interests or values protected 
by the law measure and the impact of the law measure on international trade. If this analysis 
yields a preliminary conclusion that the law measure is necessary, this result must be 
confirmed by comparing the law measure with its possible alternatives, which may be less 
trade-restrictive while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective pursued.
96
 
For instance, in the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres case, the Appellate Body found that the impact 
ban on retreaded tyres was “apt to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its 
objective”, (i.e. the reduction in waste tyres volumes.97 The Appellate Body also found that 
the proposed alternatives, which were mostly remedial in nature (i.e. waste management and 
disposal, were not real alternatives to the import ban, which could prevent the accumulation 
of tyres.
98
 
In EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body also found, as a result of a process of weighing and 
balancing a series of factors, that there was no reasonably available alternative to a trade 
prohibition. This was clearly designed to achieve the level of health protection chosen by 
France and the value pursued by the measure was found to be “both vital and important in the 
highest degree”.99 The Appellate body made the point that the more vital or important the 
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common interests or values pursued, the easier it was to accept as necessary law measures 
designed to achieve those ends.
100
 
For the law measure to be “relating to “ the conservation of national resources in line with 
article XX (g), a substantial relationship between the law measure and the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources needs to be established. In the words of the Appellate Body, a 
member has to establish that the means (i.e. the chosen measure), are “reasonably related” to 
the ends (i.e. the stated law and policy goal of conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources).
101
 Moreover, in order to be justified under article XX (g), a law measure affecting 
imports must be applied “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption”.102 
For instance, in the context of the US-Gasoline case, the United States has adopted a law 
measure relating the composition and emission effects on gasoline in order to reduce air 
pollution in the United States. The Appellate Body found that the chose law measure was 
“primarily aimed at” the law and policy goal of conservation of clean air in the United States 
and thus fell within the scope of paragraph (g) of article XX.
103
 As far as the second 
requirement of paragraph (g) is concerned, the Appellate Body ruled that the law measure 
met the “even-handedness” requirement, as it affected both imported and domestic 
products.
104
 
In the US-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body considered that the general structure and design 
of the law measure in question were “fairly narrowly focused” and that it was not a banklet 
prohibition of the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences to sea 
turtles;
105
 thus, the appellate Body concluded that the regulation in question was a law 
measure “relating to” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning 
of article XX (g).
106
 The Appellate Body also found that the law measure in question had 
been made effective in conjunction with the restrictions on domestic harvesting of shrimp, as 
required by article XX (g).
107
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In the context of climate change, according both to article XX (b) and to article XX (g), a 
substantial link will need to be established between the trade law measure and the 
environmental objective. It should be noted that in Brazil-Retreaded tyres, the Appellate 
Body recognized that certain complex environmental problems may be tackled only with a 
comprehensive law measures. The Appellate body pointed out that results obtained from 
certain action, for instance, law measures adopted in order to address global warming and 
climate change, can only be evaluated with the benefit of time.
108
 
 
3.3. The importance of the manner in which trade-related environmental law measures 
are applied  
The introductory clause of article XX emphasizes the manner in which the law measure in 
question is applied. Specifically, the application of the law measure must not constitute a 
“means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on 
international trade”.  
The chapeau of article XX requires that the law measure does not constitute an abuse or 
misuse of the provisional justification made available under one of the paragraphs of article 
XX, that is to say, is applied in good faith.
109
 In Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body 
recalled that the chapeau serves to ensure that WTO members’ right to avail themselves of 
exceptions is exercised in good faith in order to protect legitimate interests, not as a means to 
circumvent one member’s obligations towards other WTO members.110 In other words, 
article XX embodies that recognition by WTO members of the need to maintain a balance 
between the right of a member to involve an exception, and the rights of the other members 
under the GATT. 
WTO jurisprudence has highlighted some of the circumstances which may help to 
demonstrate that a law measure is applied in accordance with the chapeau of article XX. 
These include relevant coordination and cooperation activities undertaken by the defendant at 
the international level in trade and environmental area, the design of the law measure, its 
flexibility to take into account different situations in different countries, as well as an analysis 
of the rationale put forward to explain the existence of a discrimination (the rationale for the 
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discrimination needs to have some connection to stated objective of the law measure at 
issue).   
For instance, in the US-Gasoline decision, the Appellate body considered that the United 
States had not sufficiently explored the possibility of entering into cooperative arrangements 
with affected countries in order to mitigate the administrative problems raised by the United 
States in their justification of the discriminatory treatment.
111
 Moreover, in the US-Shrimp 
case, the fact that the United States had “treated WTO members differently” by adopting a 
cooperative approach regarding the protection of sea turtles with some members but not with 
others also showed that the law measures was applied in a manner that discriminated among 
WTO members in an unjustifiable manner.
112
 
At the compliance stage, in US-Shrimp (article 21.5), the appellate body found that, in view 
of the serious, good faith efforts made by the United States to negotiate an international 
agreement on the protection of sea turtles, including with the complainant, the law measure 
was now applied in a manner that no longer constituted a means of unjustifiable or arbitrary 
discrimination.
113
 The Appellate Body also acknowledged that, “as far as possible”, a 
multilateral approach is strongly preferred” over a unilateral approach.114 But, it added that, 
although the conclusion of multilateral agreements was preferable, it was not a prerequisite to 
benefit from the justifications in article XX to enforce national environmental law 
measures.
115
 
Moreover, in the US-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body was of the view that rigidity and 
inflexibility in the application of the law measure (e.g. by overlooking the conditions in other 
countries) constituted unjustifiable discrimination.
116
 It was deemed not acceptable that a 
WTO member would require another member to adopt essentially the same regulatory 
programme, without taking into consideration those conditions in other members’ territories 
might be different, and that the law and policy solutions might be different, and that the law 
and policy solution might be ill-adapted to their particular conditions.
117
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In order to implement the panel and Appellate Body recommendations, the United States 
revised its law measure and conditioned market access on the adoption of a programme 
comparable in effectiveness to that of the United States. For the appellate Body, in US-
Shrimp (article 21.5), this allowed for sufficient flexibility in the application of the law 
measures so as to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.
118
 The Appellate Body 
pointed out, however, that article XX does not require a WTO member to anticipate and 
provide explicitly for the specific conditions prevailing in every individual member.
119
 
Finally, an environmental law measure may not constitute a “disguised restriction on 
international trade”, i.e. may not result in protectionism. In past cases, it was found that the 
protective application of a law measure could most often be descend from its “design, 
architecture and revealing structure”. For instance, in US-Shrimp (article 21.5), the fact that 
the revised law measure allowed exporting countries to apply programmes based on the 
mandatory use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) and offered technical assistance to develop 
the use of TEDs in third countries, showed that the law measure was not applied so as to 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.
120
 
 
4 Conclusion 
The straightforward solution to the WTO-inconsistency of trade-related climate change law 
and policy measures would be to change the relevant WTO provisions to accommodate 
climate change law and policy concerns.
121
 It would imply, inter alia, a permission of 
differentiation among products on the basis of PPMs for the purposes of GATT Articles I and 
III, acceptability of energy and carbon taxes for adjustment, supplementing GATT Article 
XX with a paragraph which would contain an exception particularly for climate change law 
and measures etc. 
WTO members may adopt a decision on interpretation of WTO rules to accommodate 
climate change concerns. In 1998, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging WTO 
members to adopt a Statement of Understanding concerning the interpretation of a “like 
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products” concept which would enable otherwise identical products to be differentiated based 
on PPMs for environmental purposes.
122
 
In any case, the procedure of changing rules of the WTO is very difficult. Pursuant to article 
X:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (the WTO Agreement), changes into 
the vital provisions of WTO agreements, including the MFN principle of GATT Article I and 
tariff concessions of GATT Article II, can take effect only upon acceptance of all WTO 
members. Amendments into other provisions as well as decisions and understandings on 
interpretation of WTO provisions (article IX: 2 of the WTO Agreement) require two-thirds of 
WTO member votes. In the current situation of developing countries’ opposition to emission 
controls, including carbon-related border adjustments, to get such consensus would be 
practically impossible.
123
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CHAPTER IV 
NATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO STATE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers which various domestic climate change law and policy options are 
possibly compatible with WTO rules. Four law and policy options are discussed: 
energy/GHG taxes, product regulations and standards, subsidies, and domestic emissions 
trading. Note that any of these might be perceived by someone as a “trade barrier”. But they 
are categorised as “domestic” law and policy options in this study because they are not 
premised on treating imports differently from domestic products. 
For many laws and policies options, the most relevant GATT law constraints will be Article 
III, which bars a government from discriminating against “like” products from other 
countries, and Article XX, which allows General Exceptions for several purposes, including 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and health, and measures relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Article III imposes the obligation of 
“national treatment”, requiring imported goods to be treated no less favorably than “like” 
domestic goods. In a dispute, the two key questions will be: (1) whether the domestic product 
and the competing import are “like” and (2) whether the treatment of the import is less 
favorable.
124
 A government law measure that violates Article III can be excused under Article 
XX when the law and policy fits within one of the General Exceptions, provided that the 
measure is not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner and is not a disguised 
restriction on international trade. In the first eight years of the WTO, Article XX has been 
interpreted more flexible than in previous GATT jurisprudence.
125
 
 
4.2 Energy/GHG Taxes 
A tax may be an appropriate instrument to address climate change law measures because it 
can reduce demand for energy, promote more efficient technologies, and with GHG taxes, 
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lead to the adoption of cleaner energy. Because a tax conveys the same incentive to all 
emitters, those who can reduce emissions at low cost will do so. 
WTO rules have many implications for how a government may employ domestic taxes. If a 
government refrained from rebating any tax on exports and refrained from applying any tax 
to imports, then no WTO legal problems would be encountered. But such tax restraint is 
unlikely. Governments will usually seek to apply domestic taxes symmetrically to imported 
products in order to prevent distortions and seek a level playing field.
126
 Similarly, 
governments may want to unburden exports from taxes in order to prevent double taxation. 
Such governmental concerns about fairness can, in general, be carried out in conformity with 
WTO rules. Nevertheless, many potential points of tension exist. To explain the application 
of WTO rules to energy/GHG taxes, the study presents several hypotheticals situations 
below. 
 
4.2.1 Gasoline Tax 
Gasoline tax starts with a tax on gasoline at the retail level. As long as the tax is imposed 
identically on gasoline produced from domestic and imported sources, it would be in accord 
with the “national treatment” requirement in GATT Article III that a tax on an imported 
product cannot be in excess of the tax on a like domestic product.  
 
4.2.2 Automotive Fuel economy Tax 
It considers a tax on automobiles based on the fuel economy of each model type. If such a tax 
is applied in an origin-neutral manner, it could be in accord with GATT article III. Yet 
complications can arise if it turns out that the brunt of the tax is borne by imported vehicles. 
The exporting country can argue that the tax amounts to de facto discrimination because the 
tax accords protection to domestic production. Should a dispute panel agree? The taxing 
government would have an opportunity to defend the difference by invoking the exceptions 
in Article XX. The success of such a defense would depend on the precise facts of the case 
including how the tax is being administratively applied. In the 1994 Automobile Taxes case, a 
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GATT panel ruled that high-fuel efficient cars are not “like” gas-guzzling cars, but whether 
the contemporary WTO jurisprudence would lead to the same result is unclear.  
 
4.2.3 Fuel Carbon Tax 
Another hypothesis is a tax based on the carbon content of fuel. In a recent submission to the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment,
127
 Saudi Arabia advocated basing fossil fuel 
taxes on carbon content in order to reduce energy market distortions.
128
 A key legal judgment 
would be whether differential taxes on fuel (e.g. natural gas versus coal) lead to higher taxes 
being imposed on imports, in violation of GATT article III. If so, then the government 
applying the tax would seek to offer a defense under GATT Article XX. Some analysts doubt 
that such a defense would be successful.
129
 
 
4.2.4 Process-Based Electricity Tax 
Greater legal complexity would ensue with a tax on electricity based on the amount of GHG 
emissions during the generation of the power. For example, electricity produced from 
hydropower could be taxed lower than electricity produced from oil. The discussion here 
assumes that electricity is a good rather than a service.
130
 
A 1998 case arising under European Union law is instructive because of its similarity to 
WTO law. In the Outokumpu Oy proceeding, Finland taxed electricity using different rates 
depending on how it was generated.
131
 Because of the practical difficulty of determining how 
imported energy was produced, Finland taxed imports at a flat rate set to approximate an 
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average of the domestic rates.
132
 The importer complained that this flat rate was a violation of 
the European Communities Treaty, which forbids direct and indirect discrimination against 
imported products. The Court agreed, and explained that Finland’s law did not give the 
importer the opportunity to demonstrate that its electricity produced by a particular method in 
order to qualify for the rate applicable to domestic electricity produced by the same 
method.
133
 It is unclear how the Court would have ruled had Finland provided importers the 
same variable rates.
134
 
 
4.2.5. Tax on energy Used  
Instead of a gasoline tax at the consumer level, government might impose a tax at the 
producer level based on the amount of energy used in production. If set at high rates, such a 
tax can reduce the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. Two 
responses to this loss of competitiveness are in use. One is to grant tax exemptions to the 
most energy-intensive industries. This is the approach sometimes used in Europe for high 
energy taxes. The other is to provide for a border tax adjustment on imports and exports. 
Because the tax is not a straight levy on an imported product, it is interesting to recall that 
when the U.S. House of Representatives passed a Btu (British thermal unit) tax in 1993, it 
include a provision for a border tax adjustment, which was criticized by the European 
Communities as a GATT violation. 
Both responses to a loss of competitiveness, tax exemptions and border tax adjustments, 
present trade law concerns. If a government generally imposes a high energy tax but then 
exempts particular industries, such an exemption might be viewed as a specific subsidy that 
would be actionable under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM). Furthermore, if an exemption is targeted to industries that export, it might be viewed 
as an export subsidy illegal under the SCM. The other option, a border tax adjustment, is 
problematic for energy because that is a murky area law. Indeed, the WTO Secretariat has 
recently opined that a tax on the energy consumed in producing a ton of steel “cannot be 
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exported, there is no way for the importing country to determine how that particular electricity was 
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generation is taxed, the tax can be calculated using the proportions of various production processes.  
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applied to imported steel, even if it is charged on domestically produced steel”, and even 
though this difference in treatment would make the imported steel cheaper and less 
environmentally friendly.
135
 
To understand the legal uncertainty regarding border adjustments for energy, one should start 
with the basic contours. According to the GATT, nothing prevents a government from 
imposing at the time of importation a charge equivalent to an internal tax on a like article 
from which the imported product has been manufactured “in whole or in part.”136 This 
principle became a key issue in the Superfund case of 1987.
137
 This was the first GATT based 
legal challenge to a domestic environmental tax. The United States had imposed an excise tax 
on some harmful chemicals produced domestically. In addition, the U.S. government taxed 
imported substances based on the content of “chemicals used as materials in the manufacture 
or production of the imported substance” when those chemicals were subject to U.S. 
taxation.
138
 The European Economic Community challenged this border adjustment on 
several grounds, but the GATT panel dismissed this effort to prevent border adjustments for 
an environmental tax.
139
 The panel held that whether a tax is enacted for revenue or to 
encourage rational use of environmental resources is irrelevant to the legality of the border 
adjustment.
140
 The holding in Superfund permitting the border adjustment would apply, in 
principle, to any ingredient physically present in the imported product. 
How the Superfund holding would apply to materials or energy used in manufacturing a 
product is uncertain. Such materials would not be physically present in the final product. In 
1970, a GATT Working Party was constituted to examine “Border Tax Adjustments,” and 
this report has often been cited authoritatively in subsequent jurisprudence.
141
 The Working 
Party agreed that taxes directly levied on products (e.g. a sales tax) are eligible for a tax 
adjustment, and taxes not levied on products (e.g. a payroll tax) are not eligible for 
adjustment. Yet the Working Party was unable to agree on the status of adjustments for 
“hidden taxes,” which are taxes on capital equipment, advertising, energy, machinery, 
                                                          
135
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transport, and other services.
142
 The category of hidden taxes includes many excise taxes that 
are of interest in the current climate change debate, such as taxes on energy, refrigerants, 
cleansers, and transport used in the production process. Whether or not such a tax adjustment 
on imports would meet the WTO’s border adjustment rules would seem determinative of its 
legality. While one can easily see a competitiveness rationale to use a border tax adjustment, 
it is difficult to visualize a valid environmental reason under GATT Article XX in support of 
a border adjustment. 
In sum, upstream or downstream taxes on energy can be a valuable climate change 
instrument, and, so far, WTO case law has not diminished options for determining the best 
point of compliance.
143
. Governments considering such taxes and border adjustments should 
design them carefully, taking into account WTO law and using any space created by legal 
ambiguities.
144
  
 
4.3 Product Regulations and Standards 
In the WTO lexicon, “regulations” are defined as mandatory instruments and “standards” are 
defined as non-mandatory. The analysis below will follow WTO usage. Both regulations and 
standards are important components of climate change law and policy, and may be 
increasingly so in the future. Some examples are regulations/standards on automobile fuel 
economy, emissions reduction in manufacturing, and energy efficiency in homes. Being 
mandatory, regulations are imposed by governments. Standards, however, can be authored by 
numerous actors, e.g. governments, international organisations, private bodies, and 
nongovernmental organisations. Furthermore, an economic or social actor can impose a 
standard upon itself. For example, an Olympic Committee or a corporation can commit to 
emission reduction goals. 
The application of WTO rules to climate change regulations and standards is explained below 
through hypotheticals situations. 
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4.3.1 Fuel Economy Regulation 
A fuel economy regulation will be subject to the same National Treatment requirements as a 
fuel economy tax. More importantly, however, such a regulation will also be subject to the 
discipline of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which is more 
stringent than those in the GATT.
145
 The most onerous substantive requirements are that a 
regulatory measure is the least-trade-restrictive way to fulfill a legitimate objective and the 
measure is based on an international standard unless that standard would be ineffective or 
inappropriate means to fulfill a legitimate objective. The TBT Agreement includes the 
protection of the environment in an illustrative list of legitimate objectives.  
Consider the example of Japan’s automotive fuel efficiency law. In 1998, Japan announced 
that it would be promulgating binding regulations for energy efficiency of nine classes of 
automobiles grouped by weight of the vehicle. The target in the year 2010 for each class was 
pegged at the “top runner,” which happened to be a Japanese vehicle. Manufactures selling 
vehicles in a weight class that cumulatively perform less well on average than the top runner 
are to be assessed a penalty. Several governments complained about this regulation, and 
called it a violation of the TBT Agreement.
146
 The dispute was never brought to the WTO, 
however, and Japan has expressed confidence that its regulation conforms to TBT.  
One lesson from this episode is that any national regulation having a disparate trade effect on 
foreign producers will raise concerns under TBT. The underlying problem is that the 
regulator may center attention on one attribute that may be relatively less important in other 
countries. In this episode, Japan was most concerned about fuel economy, but imported 
vehicles that are heavier may reflect competing concerns in the country of manufacture about 
pollution or safety.  
 
 
                                                          
145
 It should be noted that the stringency gap between TBT and the GATT is narrowing. In the Asbestos case, 
the WTO Appellate Body interpreted the GATT Article XX (b) exception to require the use of a less trade 
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4.3.2 HFC Regulation 
Some regulations are based on product characteristics or the absence thereof. An example is 
the Danish law to prohibit after 2007 the sale or importation of products containing hydro-
fluorocarbons (HFC), a potent greenhouse gas used in refrigerators (Atlantic Council 2002, 
pp. 22-23). European and U.S. trade associations expressed concern that this legislation could 
violate the TBT Agreement. One argument made was that HFCs are harmless if they do not 
leak, and therefore, the legitimate climate objectives of Denmark can be achieved in a less 
trade-restrictive way.   
 
4.3.3 Voluntary Standard 
Corporate action to adopt voluntary climate change standards has become increasingly 
salient. A standard that is exclusively internal to a company is not covered by the TBT 
Agreement even if it has transborder effects. Yet when a standard-setting organisation 
devises a standard, it can come within the scope of these rules. The TBT Agreement permits 
any standardizing body (in a WTO Member country) to accept the TBT Code of Good 
Practice for the preparation, adoption and application of standards.
147
  Some of the most 
important norms in the code for climate standard-setting are the procedural provisions. For 
example, the requirement that interested parties be given 60 days to submit comments can 
assist in the design of fair and effective standards.
148
 
 
4.3.4 Climate Labeling 
Labeling is a key instrument of environmental law and policy implemented via the market. 
Because everyone contributes to GHG emissions, encouraging individual responsibility can 
be an important component of an overall climate change law and policy. In order to act 
knowledgeably, however, individual need information about the environmental impact of 
production and consumption. If it turns out that the WTO inhibits such information flows that 
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would present a serious problem. In recent years, the trade community has criticised eco-
labels, even private, voluntary ones.
149
 
Labels that describe the characteristics of a good are unlikely to conflict with WTO rules. For 
example, the European Community has directed Member States to require a label for new 
automobile models that would display information about fuel consumption and carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions. So long as such a label applies equally to domestic and imported 
cars, it would seem to be consistent with both GATT and TBT rules. 
By contrast, mandatory labels regarding the production process could trigger a WTO-based 
challenge. Many climate-related life cycle labels are imaginable. Suppose that government 
requires a product to be labeled with information regarding the GHG emitted during its 
production process. How TBT obligations would apply to such a label is not settled in WTO 
law. Because the scope of the TBT Agreement is limited to regulations/standards on product 
characteristics and their related processes, many trade law experts had assumed that so-called 
unrelated processes, such as the type and quantity of energy used in manufacturing were 
beyond the TBT’s purview.150 But in 1997, the WTO’s TBT Committee asked governments 
to provide notification of all new labeling schemes by standardizing bodies, including 
process-related labels.
151
 If the WTO moves to assert jurisdiction over all labels, then the 
various TBT requirements will become more constraining factors in designing and applying 
climate-related labeling. 
Some trade law experts argues that WTO law would almost certainly prohibit a government 
from requiring a label specifying the level of GHGs emitted in the production process.
152
 An 
analogous issue that arose in the WTO was a proposal by the Netherlands to require a label 
identifying whether timber was harvested under sustainable forestry management. When the 
WTO was notified of this measure, several governments raised objections on the grounds that 
such a measure would violate trade rules.
153
 The proposal was also criticised within the 
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European Union. In face of these objections, the Dutch government did not finalise the 
proposal.   
 
4.4 Subsidies 
Governmental subsidies are helpful to whoever receives the subsidy, but have a variable 
value for the commonweal. When poorly conceived or designed, subsidies can make societies 
worse off by exacerbating market or government failures. The governmental community 
often criticises perverse subsidies that aggravate environmental damage (e.g. subsidies for 
coal extraction) and distort markets. The trade community often criticises subsidies that 
distort international trade, both within the subsidizing country and in other markets if the 
subsidised products are exported.  
The WTO rules on subsidies are contained in the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Non-agricultural subsidies can raise WTO concerns if they are “specific” that is, 
if they are channeled to certain enterprises. If a specific subsidy causes adverse effects to 
competing entities in foreign countries, then it can be actionable in the WTO.
154
 Government 
grants top the automobile industry to develop new technologies, or subsidies for afforestation, 
could be “specific,” especially in the absence of objective criteria for eligibility. An 
agricultural subsidy to sequester carbon in soil, or to reduce GHG emissions from rice 
cultivation or raising cattle, would be permitted under the “Green Box” (in the Agreement on 
Agriculture) so long as the subsidy did not have more than minimal effects on productions.
155
  
The transborder applicability of the WTO’s expert subsidy rules may also be important in 
climate change law and policy. If government A subsidises entities in Country B so as to 
promote exports from country A, such a subsidy may be prohibited by the SCM 
Agreement.
156
  These disciplines will need to be examined in designing climate partnership 
programs between industrial and developing countries.  
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4.5 Domestic Emissions Trading 
Because of the wide range of implementation costs in reducing GHG emissions, domestic 
programs with flexible emissions trading can reduce overall costs. Emissions trading can be 
carried out under the aegis of an international treaty, under national regulation, or in 
voluntary programs. Emissions’ trading between economic actors in the same country does 
not raise any WTO-related concerns. The WTO problems, if they exist, are in the interface 
between the trading programs in two countries. If country A’s trading rules make it harder for 
an economic actor in country B to do business with actors in country A that could trigger a 
complaint to the WTO by country B. 
A threshold question is whether “emissions trading” (as discussed in Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol) is even covered by WTO rules. Sometimes analysts mistakenly assume that WTO 
rules would ineluctably govern world trade in climate units. Despite its name, the WTO does 
not govern trade itself. What it governs are the trade restrictions that nations impose on 
transborder trade in goods and services. 
Marketable rights created via an emissions trading regime are unlikely to be a “service” or 
“good” that fits under the scope of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) or the GATT.
157
 So far, governments have not suggested that trade in rights created 
by a government are within the purview of the WTO. For example, regulations on the 
transborder sale of a land title, a license, a patent, sovereign debt, and currency are not 
covered by WTO rules.
158
 Indeed, the GATS Annex on Air Transport Services specifically 
excludes “traffic rights, however granted.”159 
Yet even though emissions trading per se is not supervised by WTO rules, these rules may 
come into play when: (1) there is government involvement in the emissions trading system 
and (2) emissions trading affects the flow of trade in goods and services. Thus, emissions 
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trading can have indirect effects on commerce that might lead to a violation of trade rules.
160
 
For example, suppose that country A has a GHG trading system that does recognise emission 
units originating in countries outside the Kyoto Protocol.
161
 Such a requirement might make it 
harder to import energy products from non-Parties because fuel producers therein might not 
have emission units to accompany sales. That could infringe the GATT Article III national 
treatment rule because it would destabilise competition between imported and domestic 
products, giving less favorable treatment to the foreign product.
162
 In that scenario, country A 
seeks to offer a defense under GATT article XX, such as the impracticality of verifying 
foreign units. 
Another concern regarding emissions trading is whether the free transfer by governments of 
units to private companies would be considered a subsidy. One analyst has cogently argued 
that the allocation of an allowance is not a “financial contribution” by a government within 
the definition of subsidy in the SCM Agreement.
163
 Recent WTO jurisprudence has planted 
some doubts, however. In the WTO Lumber decision, the panel ruled that a financial 
contribution is not limited to a money-transferring action, but also encompasses an in-kind 
transfer of resources that can be valued, such as the “right” to harvest public trees.164 This 
ruling might suggest that the giveaway of a valuable emission right by a government is a 
subsidy. Of course, the Lumber precedent is distinguishable from a GHG emission because 
lumber itself is a traded good in a way that an emission is not.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
The general approach under WTO rules has been to acknowledge that some degree of trade 
restriction may be necessary to achieve certain law and policy objectives, as long as a number 
of carefully crafted conditions are respected. WTO case law has confirmed that WTO rules 
do not trump environmental requirements. If, for instance, a border measure related to climate 
change was found to be inconsistent with one of the core provisions of the GATT, 
justification might nonetheless be sought under the general exceptions to the GATT (i.e. 
Article XX), provided that two key conditions are met. 
First, the law measures must fall under at least one of the GATT exceptions, and a connection 
must be established between the stated goal of the climate change law and policy and the 
border measure at issue.  
Second, the manner in which the measure in question will be applied is important: in 
particular, the measure must not constitute a “means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination”. GATT case law has show that the implementation of a measure in a way that 
does not amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or to a disguised restriction on 
international trade has often been the most challenging aspect of the use of GATT exceptions.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1.  CONCLUSIONS 
Interaction between trade and climate change law and policy contains potential conflict. How 
big potential of the conflict is difficult to estimate, to a large extent because of the indefinite 
relationship between the rights and obligations of countries under the WTO Agreements and 
their rights and obligations under the UNFCCC or any future international climate agreement. 
Although the international climate change regime (the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol) 
does not explicitly provide for the use of trade-related measures, in the absence of a post-
Kyoto international agreement trade measures will likely be taken unilaterally, in the form of 
border adjustments to level the playing field for domestic producers in countries with 
emission reduction commitments and to prevent carbon leakage to countries with lax 
emission controls. Carbon-related border adjustment measures (BAMs) will most probably 
run afoul of WTO rules on non-discrimination and WTO disciplines on subsidies, primarily 
as these measures would be imposed not on product directly but on emissions happened 
abroad, i.e. on the way the products were produced. 
If carbon-related BAMs were designed to be compliant with conditions stipulated by GATT 
Article XX, they would have chances to be defended as a life/health and/or environmental 
exception to the GATT obligations. As the analysis in the paper shows, meeting the 
requirement of chapeau of Article XX to take into account conditions in other countries 
would be crucial. In practice, it would mean that a measure should be flexible enough to treat 
more favourably imports from countries, which have taken emission reduction efforts in any 
form, and to differentiate in treatment depending on a country’s level of economic 
development. A measure should also take into account the rights and obligations of an 
exporting country under an international climate change agreement. And finally, to fit in the 
scope of Article XX, it seems to be more reasonable to position a measure as simply a border 
measure (e.g. a carbon tariff), rather than a border adjustment measure. A border adjustment 
measure might fall outside the scope of Article XX due to its intrinsic competition-related 
motive of levelling the playing field of producers and because of traditionally symmetric 
application of border adjustment, not only imposing emission charges on imports but also 
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giving rebate (of allowances/emission costs) to exporters, which would run contrary to 
climate change law and policy goals. Therefore, a country intending to defend a measure as 
an exception to its GATT obligations should from the very beginning adjust the design and 
the implementation of a measure to pass the justification test under Article XX.  
Although justification of a carbon-related BAM under GATT Article XX is not entirely 
excluded, it will be quite difficult to design and implement a measure in a way which would 
satisfy the conditions of Article XX, especially its chapeau. Furthermore, justification of 
violations by a measure of GATT rules under GATT Article XX can be made each time only 
through litigation in the WTO. This implies that the problem of incompliance will have to be 
resolved each time anew. Therefore, there seems to be a need for long-lasting institutional 
solutions to the problem of WTO incompliance of carbon-related BAMs.  
As this paper shows, there are a number of institutional solutions to the problem of WTO 
inconsistency of carbon-related BAMs that could be discussed. These solutions may be 
achieved through multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral negotiations and even through 
adjudication by the WTO dispute settlement bodies. Yet, each of them lacks either feasibility 
or effectiveness. Most of them would lack political will necessary for their adoption: to reach 
consensus or the necessary vote on the use of measures, which negatively affect economic 
interests of the majority of (developing) countries would be hardly possible. Solutions 
adopted plurilaterally (i.e. only by those countries which agree to them) would lack 
effectiveness, as they could be easily surmounted by non-agreeing parties. 
Of all approaches to address the problem of WTO inconsistency of carbon-related BAMs, 
which were discussed in this paper, the bilateral approach seems most feasible. It be possible 
to include provisions on carbon-related BAMs, including mutual recognition of climate 
change law and policy actions and refraining from using BAMs, in bilateral and regional 
FTAs and economic cooperation agreements. The experience of the WTO shows that many 
sensitive trade-related issues were first negotiated bilaterally or at the regional level and only 
then were brought to the multilateral negotiations. Provisions on climate change law and 
policy trade-related measures would be just part of a much broader economic cooperation 
agreement, which included trade, investment, government procurement and other issues. 
Therefore, even if such provisions were contrary to the interests of one of the parties to the 
agreement, there would always be something which would be given by the other parties in 
compensation for this. Nothing would preclude negotiating on carbon-related BAMs, 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
especially if one of the parties is a developed country which can exercise its political and 
economic power or can offer concession in other areas. The inclusion of provisions on 
carbon-related BAMs in FTAs would largely depend on the objectives, nature and scope of 
the agreements. 
As to the idea of following the origin principle of taxation instead of the destination principle, 
notwithstanding it is an ideal solution in terms of environmental effectiveness and 
administrative efficiency, it is problematic. It requires universal application and 
harmonisation of emissions taxes or establishment of a global emissions trading scheme with 
a global price on carbon. In the absence of universal carbon constraints, the origin-based 
emissions taxes or charges cannot address the problem of competitiveness and carbon 
leakage. Furthermore, except in the case of carbon incentive sectors producing for local 
consumption, to level the playing field, emissions charges will still need to be imposed on 
imports from countries with no carbon constraints. Such a hybrid system of taxation will 
complicate the issue of WTO compliance even further. From a WTO perspective, origin-
based emissions taxes are not acceptable, because traditionally the origin principle is applied 
with respect to direct taxes, while indirect taxes are imposed according to the destination 
principle. 
 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS   
2.1. Establishing an international standard for catalytic converters.  Achieving minimum 
standards on energy efficiency or definitions of clean energy would provide several benefits. 
One is trade facilitation stemming from harmonization. Another is inducing technological 
breakthrough from larger potential markets. Taking note of the role of the catalytic converter 
in promoting the phaseout of leaded gasoline, Scott Barrett has suggested that common 
technology standards can be used to reduce GHG emissions from automobiles or from fossil-
fuel power plants.
165
 
International product standards are proposed in many fora, the most prominent of which is 
the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). In recent years, the ISO has set up a 
Climate Change Task Force and begun developing standards programs, such as the 
                                                          
165
 Barrett, Scott (2001). Towards a better climate treaty, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, November.  
 
 
 
 
50 
 
International Energy Conservation Code. For automotive standards, the Economic for 
Europe’s World Forum for Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations is starting to consider 
standards for hybrid and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. 
TBT Article 2.4 promotes the expended use of international standards, stating that: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members shall use them or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for 
their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would 
be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives 
pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental 
technological problems.
166
  
Building on the above TBT rule, the WTO could collaborate with the UNFCCC to promote 
minimum international (or regional) standards pertinent to climate. Addressing global 
warming would be an ideal objective to test the possibilities of new efforts to bring together 
trade, energy, and environmental officials at the national and international levels. The 
governments could encourage standard-setting institutions to accelerate the development of 
climate-related standards, and once such international standards are devised in a suitable 
manner, governments could use them as a basis for technical regulations.   
2.2. Facilitating taxes on energy. In view of the negative environmental externalities caused 
by the production and consumption of energy, strong grounds exist to subject energy to 
greater taxation. Several governments have made energy or GHG taxes a major part of 
strategies to combat climate change. A coordinated approach to national energy taxes could 
be an effective and flexible way to control emissions without leading to inter-country 
distortions.
167
 Although the idea of getting governments to agree on a uniform rate of energy 
taxation has been discussed for years. Very little progress in that direction has been made at 
the global level, or even within customs and free trade agreements. Looking ahead, the 
outlook for such agreements remains poor. 
It may be possible, however, to seek harmonization on technique rather than tax level. As 
chapter IV explained, while many energy taxes and border tax adjustments can be applied 
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without contradicting WTO rules, some forms of taxation may lead to trade disputes. Such 
disputes may be fomented when governments engineer taxes to favor homegrown energy 
sources and to gratify public biases against particular energy sources, such as nuclear. In 
other words, what will seem a reasonable method of taxation within Country A may, when 
applied to imports from Country B, seem unfair to economic actors in Country B. Right now, 
there is a considerable uncertainty within the WTO as to the rules for border tax adjustments 
on energy. If these uncertainties are left to resolution by a WTO panel, the results may be 
unsatisfactory from an environmental standpoint.   
2.3. Opening markets for environmental and energy goods and services. Liberalizing of 
trade in environmental goods and services was on the negotiating agenda for the Doha 
Round. The climate imperative is to convince governments, particularly in developing 
countries, to eliminate unjustified barriers to technology and services related to climate 
change mitigation and the CDM. One obstacle to fruitful negotiations on environmental 
technology is that this sector is poorly mapped in WTO classifications, and so the scope for 
beneficial liberalization is often not appreciated.
168
 WTO negotiations on the movement of 
natural persons supplying services can also be important for climate law and policy by 
facilitating the entry of foreign technicians to offer de-carbonisation services in developing 
countries. 
2.4. Expanding subsidy law. The WTO has complex rules on subsidies that are stronger than 
in the GATT era, yet still far from comprehensive. If there is any conceptual thread that knits 
the rules together, it would be distaste for subsidies that potentially distort international trade. 
Yet while that is an appropriate purpose, the WTO could aspire to do more by helping 
governments eliminate subsidies with high negative externalities.  
Although one strain of the ecological critique of trade law over the past decade has been that 
GATT/WTO rules are too stringent, environmentalists have also observed that on some 
issues, trade rules are too weak. After all, many government subsidies harmful to the global 
environment are not impeded by WTO rules. The worst offenders are the subsidies for the 
development of fossil fuels and for unsustainable harvesting of timber. Some agricultural 
subsidies by the richest countries are also deplorable, as they make it harder for poor 
countries to gain income through exports. 
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Perhaps the most significant environmental achievement in the Doha Declaration was the 
mandate for negotiations on fisheries subsidies. If this initiative were successful in curtailing 
such subsidies, it would establish an important precedent for WTO action on other 
environmentally damaging subsidies. For example, a future trade initiative could address 
perverse subsidies that worsen climate change. At a recent meeting of the WTO Committee 
on Trade and Environment, Saudi Arabia advocated the removal of coal and gas subsidies.
169
 
Such discourse shows the potential for some convergence with the Kyoto Protocol which 
calls on Annex I parties to implement “policies and measures” including: “Progressive 
reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions, 
and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objection of the 
(UNFCCC) Convention and application of market instruments …”170 
2.5. Safeguarding eco-labeling. Environmental labeling was in the WTO’s Doha Round 
Agenda, but a decision was not yet been made as to whether negotiations on rulemaking 
should be launched. The underlying problem is that trade rules cast a shadow over mandatory 
and voluntary labeling systems because, the meaning of those rules is unclear. The trade 
regime has a valid interest in assuring that labels do not impede trade through misinformation 
or unjustified inferences. The climate change regime has a valid interest in assuring that 
labels and seals can be used to inform the public about the ecological footprint of products, in 
order to encourage market-based solutions to environmental challenges.  
Thus, the two regime have a basis to work together to assure that WTO law does not 
constrain well-designed climate labels. Right now, it seems doubtful that climate interests are 
being voiced in the WTO. If the WTO launches negotiations on labeling, those missing 
interests need to be forced in. whatever negotiations the WTO commences could be 
facilitated by the ISO, which is developing a series of standards for environmental labeling. 
2.6. Improving recoordination between the climate change and international trade 
regime. So far, the WTO has remained largely aloof from efforts to address climate change. 
Other organizations, such as the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, have recognized that 
climate change is an important global issue, and have responded constructively. Despite the 
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fact that the WTO is trying to increase its attention to development, the WTO, as an 
intergovernmental organization, has not yet connected climate issues to trade and investment. 
Although these observerships are useful in improving mutual understanding, much more 
institutional cooperation could be attempted. The WTO General Council and the various 
WTO subsidiary bodies (such as the TBT Committee) could explore ongoing relationships 
with the conferences and meetings of the parties of the climate regime, and its subsidiary 
bodies. This would allow climate and trade officials from numerous countries to work 
together. One possibility might be a joint WTO/UNFCCC working group.
171
 The fact that the 
states in the WTO are not the same as in the UNFCCC is no barrier to holding joint meetings. 
Certainly, adequate authority exists under WTO rules for such inter-regime cooperation.
172
   
2.7. Integrating climate change and trade bargaining. Some analysts have suggested that 
governments could bargain simultaneously on climate and trade in order to achieve deals that 
would be unattainable in separate fora.
173
 This proposal should not be dismissed outright on 
grounds of imagined regime purity. Instead, such interlacing should be assessed on its own 
merits. 
One clear impediment is the MFN rule. If country A agrees to lower its trade barriers in 
return for country B’s agreement to regulate internal emissions, then A will have to give the 
same trade benefit not only to B, but also to C, D, etc., even though those countries have not 
agreed to reduce emissions. This is not a fatal problem, because MFN is already inherent in 
trade negotiations. Nevertheless, MFN does undermine the viability of “climate for trade” 
deals.     
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